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SENIOR CERTIFICATE EXAMINATIONS/ NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE EXAMINATIONS

HISTORY P1

MAY/JUNE 2025

ADDENDUM

This addendum consists of 14 pages.



QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM IN EUROPE AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1945) LEAD TO COLD WAR TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA) AND THE SOVIET UNION (USSR)?

SOURCE 1A

The extract below is from the 'Iron Curtain' speech delivered by British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946. It focuses on the threat that Soviet expansionism was posing in Europe.

Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its communist international organisation intend to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive (growing bigger) tendencies.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an *Iron Curtain* has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence, but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.


Athens alone – Greece with its immortal (eternal) glories – is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads into Germany and mass expulsions (removal) of millions of Germans, on a scale grievous (critical) and undreamed of, are now taking place. The communist parties, which were very small in all these eastern states of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence (domination) and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control.

[From *Book of Great Speeches* by A Burnet]



SOURCE 1B

The visual source below, by the British cartoonist Illingworth, was published in *The Daily Mail* on 16 June 1947. It depicts Stalin's policy of expansion in Eastern Europe.



SOURCE 1C

The source below is from an article titled 'Kissinger and Acheson: The Secretary of State and the Cold War' by W Lafeber, published in 1977. It highlights the role that Dean Acheson, Deputy Secretary of State during George Marshall's administration, played in influencing the United States to stop the spread of communism into Europe.

In early 1947, with Byrnes out and George Marshall in as the Secretary of State, the anti-communist governments of Turkey and Greece claimed to be under severe Soviet pressure and could not guarantee their own survival. Convinced that the United States must help the Turkish and Greek governments, the administration nevertheless faced the difficult task of persuading a fiscally (financially) careful Congress to provide the aid needed to support these governments.

On 27 February Truman called a meeting between administration officials and a handful of leading senators and members of Congress in the hope of winning over the legislators. Dean Acheson described this encounter as 'Armageddon' (a term used to describe the end of the world). Marshall spoke first, emphasising the need for the United States to act because it ~~was~~ the right thing to do and because no one else would help. The legislators seemed unmoved. Was it America's fight? Was the bill (cost) likely to be enormous (huge)? Acheson asked to speak.

Immediately he changed the terms of the debate. The crisis in south-eastern Europe, he said, was no local dust-up (small fight) but one that involved the two Cold War powers. The Soviets were pressuring Turkey and Greece. At stake was a vast portion of the Free World, for if Greece went communist, the corruption of Greece would infect (influence) all to the east. It would also carry the infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Europe through Italy and France. Only the United States stood in the way of a communist onslaught (attack) that would, if successful, snuff out freedom and destroy all hope of economic recovery in parts of three continents.

[Adapted from 'Kissinger and Acheson: The Secretary of State and the Cold War' by W Lafeber]



SOURCE 1D

The extract below is from *The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern Europe*, edited by TCW Blanning in 1996. It focuses on how the Soviet Union created the Cominform as a reaction to the Marshall Plan and to also strengthen its sphere of influence over Eastern Europe.

The Russians sent an eighty-strong delegation to Paris, where the European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan) was outlined and East European countries, like Czechoslovakia and Poland, expressed keen interest. But Stalin saw the American offer as a challenge to his sphere of influence. He warned the Czechs and others against participating and withdrew the Soviet delegation.

That autumn he declared ideological war on Western capitalism, creating the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) to orchestrate (set up) foreign communist parties and to replace the coalitionist (work together) strategy in France and Italy with strikes intended to bring down the governments. In the East, Soviet influence now became Soviet domination. The coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 was followed by the 'Stalinisation' of much of the region. All but communists were proscribed (prohibited), those independent of Moscow were purged (got rid of), agriculture and heavy industry were brought under state control, and civil and political liberties systematically abolished.

The Czech coup and the Berlin Crisis did much to damage the Soviet image in Europe, even in France where the Communist Party was still picking up about a quarter of the vote in elections. Equally important, well-advertised Marshall Aid was winning hearts and minds. Between 1948 and 1951 the United States put into Western Europe about \$13 billion ...

[From *The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern Europe*, edited by TCW Blanning]



QUESTION 2: WHAT IMPACT DID REGIONAL ETHNIC DIVISIONS IN ANGOLA HAVE ON THE CIVIL WAR DURING THE 1970s?**SOURCE 2A**

The source below, titled *South African Intervention in the Angolan Civil War, 1975–1976: Motivations and Implications*, is taken from research conducted by J Nerys in 2002. It explains that, due to the ineffectiveness of anticolonial movements in Angola, Portugal was able to have total control of Angola until 1975.

The military ineffectiveness of the anticolonial movements was considered to be partly responsible for the stagnation (inactivity) of the anticolonial war in Angola. This relative failure can be attributed (linked) to a number of factors, not least of which is the very fact that the nationalist forces were divided into three, separate, rival movements.

According to an ex-member of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the military weakness of this movement was more than apparent in the face of Portuguese counterinsurgency (revolutionary) operations. Despite the presence of its units on Angolan soil, there is little evidence to support the MPLA's claims that there existed 'liberated' territory: the Portuguese army controlled the borders and was free to move anywhere in the country. The other movements, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), had not fared any better.

Through the deployment of its armed forces the Portuguese regime had managed to retain effective as well as nominal (minimal) sovereignty of the colony, despite the anticolonial challenge. All this changed on 25 April 1974. Overall, the development of political and economic forces in Portugal had outgrown the structure of authority so well-maintained for 40 years by Salazar (Portuguese dictator). His successor, Marcello Caetano, had promised change but did (or could) not deliver it fast enough.

[From *South African Intervention in the Angolan Civil War, 1975–1976: Motivations and Implications* by J Nerys]



SOURCE 2B

The source below is from a book *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* by N Chazan, published in 1999. It focuses on the ethnic composition of the three main liberation movements in Angola and how the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) tried to prevent the looming civil war among them.

The three parties with distinctive social bases in Angola had organised in the 1950s to oppose Portuguese colonial rule. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was an urban movement, Marxist in intellectual orientation, multiracial, but Mbundu in its ethnic base. The National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), by contrast, was rural, ethno-populist (promoting one ethnic group), uniracial (one ethnic/race) and ethnically Bakongo, and the largest, Ovimbundu, that formed the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Even before the insurrection (uprising), the leaders of both groups [FNLA and UNITA] were well known outside Angola, having attended the various anticolonial gatherings, such as the All-African People's Conference.

The question of who would govern Angola fitted into the structure of continental alliances and ideological affinities (similarities). Each liberation movement had its preference if a nationalist coalition (alliance) should prove impossible, but the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) sought first to achieve Angolan unity and brought together Neto, Roberto and Savimbi to negotiate a common front in January 1975. They indeed signed the tri-lateral accord (Alvor Agreement) and then proceeded to negotiate an agreement with Portugal that fixed the date of the Angolan independence.


In June, the OAU once again tried to avert (prevent) the looming (forthcoming) civil war by bringing the three parties to the bargaining table. This temporary détente (agreement) was shattered in July when the FNLA, assisted by Zaire (Congo), began an offensive (attack). An OAU summit deplored (condemned) the bloodshed and appointed a commission to work for a coalition government. All African governments adhered to this posture right up to the appointed Independence Day in November 1975.

[From *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* by N Chazan]



SOURCE 2C

The map below shows the division of Angola into three main ethnic groups, namely Bakongo, Mbundu and Ovimbundu. They formed the bases of the main membership of the three liberation movements, which were the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) respectively.



[From <https://www.historynet.com/author/ron-soodalter/>. Accessed on 12 August 2024.]

- BAKONGO:** Northern Angolans supporting the FNLA and aided by the United States and Zaire (DRC)
- MBUNDU:** North-Central Angolans supporting the MPLA and aided by Cuba and the Soviet Union
- OVIMBUNDU:** Central Southern Angolans supporting UNITA and aided by the United States and South Africa



SOURCE 2D

The source below is an article titled 'Accusation and Legitimacy in the Civil War in Angola' by I Dulley. It explains how the Angolan regional ethnic rivalry grew and aligned to ideological differences of the Cold War era.

The civil war in Angola can be attributed (linked) to the action of the Portuguese government, which sought to open and maintain social and ethnic divisions among the nationalists, always establishing accords with one movement in detriment (disadvantage) to the other, whenever possible, thus fuelling the rivalry between them.

The ideological antagonism (hatred) characteristic of the support given to the movements by the Soviet Union, China and the United States during the Cold War, is a fact that internal factors related to the local socio-political and historical formation also played a central role in the conflict. In the struggle for liberation and the civil war, there were conflicts, an absence of cooperation and claims of pioneers (founders) made by the movements, which were based on antagonisms (hatred) and divisions of areas of operation.

The continuation of the contradictions already present in the struggles for liberation was reflected in the projection (plan), by both the FNLA and UNITA, of an enemy to be combatted (fought) after the colonial period as part of their construction of a narrative about themselves. The accusations made by the leaders of the movements depict the enemy as a continuation of the colonial system by accusing them of reproducing the distinctions (divisions) of race, ethnicity, regionality and class that characterised Portuguese rule in Angola.

[From 'Accusation and Legitimacy in the Civil War in Angola' by I Dulley, January 2020]



QUESTION 3: HOW DID STATE AUTHORITIES IN ALABAMA DEAL WITH THE NON-VIOLENT CHILDREN'S MARCH DURING THE BIRMINGHAM CAMPAIGN IN 1963?

SOURCE 3A

The source below, from *The Civil Rights Movement – An Illustrated History* by B Wilkinson, explains the events that took place in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963 following the release of Dr Martin Luther King Jr from jail.

Birmingham, Alabama's largest city, had the reputation among civil rights activists as the 'worst big city in the USA'. Eighteen unsolved bombings in black neighbourhoods between the late 1950s and 1963 gave it its nickname, Bombingham. The protests began in downtown Birmingham on 3 April 1963 under the baleful (threatening) eye of Police Commissioner 'Bull' Connor, who held his fire for several weeks during which Dr King was imprisoned and kept in solitary confinement for three days. During this period, he (Dr King) wrote the powerful 'Letter from Birmingham Jail' drafted on 16 April on scraps of paper.

... several days after King was released on bail, all hell broke loose in the city. Hundreds of adolescents and younger children had been recruited by 2 May 1963, and they took to the streets with enthusiasm (Children's March). More than 900 of them were arrested that day. The next day the march to the City Hall was aborted (cancelled) when police barricaded (blocked) the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church with a thousand protestors inside. Those who attempted to leave were assaulted with fire hoses set to pressure that would strip off tree bark, clubbed (beaten) indiscriminately (randomly) and attacked by police dogs. The carnage (bloodshed) shocked the nation as scenes from the war in Vietnam would do soon afterwards.

Young black men in the city's poorest sections repudiated (rejected) non-violence and rioted against their oppressors. White merchants faced a sea of black picketers (demonstrators) and protestors who discouraged patronage (support) of their stores.

[From *The Civil Rights Movement – An Illustrated History* by B Wilkinson]



SOURCE 3B

The photograph below is from the *Black History Buff* podcast. It shows Martin Luther King Jr with some of the children and youth who participated in the Children's March in Birmingham, Alabama, on 2 May 1963.



[From <https://steadyhq.com/en/blackhistory/posts/19bc41d7-0297-4f98-abf4-a17bea49bff3>. Accessed on 27 July 2024.]

**SEGREGATION
MUST GO**

SCLC

**DON'T BUY IN
SEGREGATED
St. John County**

**The City Officials
WON'T TALK
To Us
CHILDREN**



SOURCE 3C

The source below is an interview conducted in 1995 by B Wilkinson with Audrey Faye Hendriks who was 9 years old at the time of the Children's March. In the interview she describes how they were interrogated by the police in Birmingham.

Audrey Faye Hendriks, nine years old and in the third grade, was one of the children arrested on 2 May. Later, she would recall, 'I wasn't nervous or scared. We started at the Sixteenth Street Church. We always sang when we left the church. The singing was like a jubilation (overjoyed). It was release ... it also gave you calmness and reassurance. We went down ... by Kelly Ingram Park and marched about half a block. Then the police put us in paddy wagons. There were lots of kids, but I think I must have been the youngest child in there.'

The policemen later separated Audrey Faye to interrogate (question) her about the march. They pressed for details of the plans and suggested that she had been forced to participate. 'I was nervous when they first called me in,' she remembers. 'The worst thing I thought was that they might kill me. After they started asking me questions, I calmed down a little and thought, maybe they're not going to do anything. But it crossed my mind. It was a room of five or six men. All white. And I was little ...'

After being questioned, Audrey was finally returned to her cell, where she remained jailed with other children for seven days. 'We slept in little rooms with bunk beds ... about twelve of us to a room. We called ourselves Freedom Fighters. The food wasn't home cooking. I remember some grits (ground maize meal porridge) and they weren't good. My parents couldn't get word to me for seven days.' As demonstrations continued, news came that the cells were full and the police were now forced to take students to the fairgrounds to house them. 'I felt like I was helping to gain freedom.'

[From *The Civil Rights Movement - An Illustrated History* by B Wilkinson]



SOURCE 3D

The extract below is from a book, *I Have a Dream – The Life and Works of Martin Luther King Jr*, written by J Haskins. It explains the steps taken by the US government to introduce changes to the Constitution after the Birmingham Campaign.

The shocking images from Birmingham stunned (shocked) the nation and the world. On college campuses, progressive white students couldn't believe the injustice that was occurring in their country. Gloria Clark remembered Bull Connor being interviewed on television, 'I've never forgotten this line, "We can take care of our own negroes* ourselves ..." And I said no way is he going to define how people are treated in this country I live in. No way do I want a man like that defining it.'

At the urging of the US Attorney-General Robert Kennedy, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and Birmingham businesses brokered (came to) an agreement on 10 May. The latter agreed to desegregate lunch counters and certain other facilities and to improve hiring practices for black citizens. Governor George Wallace would denounce the deal and on 11 May bombs exploded at the homes of AD King (Dr Martin Luther King's brother) and at the Gaston Motel where Dr King had been staying. Following the violence in Birmingham, which outraged most of his colleagues in Washington, Kennedy believed it was time to put civil rights at the forefront of his agenda – and soon because events were happening quickly.

On 20 May the US Supreme Court declared the city segregation ordinances (orders) were unconstitutional. In Jackson, Mississippi, sit-in activists were being abused by segregationists. Two days later King sent a telegram to the president requesting a meeting. King hoped that he could persuade Kennedy to issue an executive order against segregation.

[From *I Have a Dream – The Life and Works of Martin Luther King Jr* by J Haskins]

***Negroes** – a derogatory word from the period of the slave trade that was used for African Americans



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

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